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TAX EXEMPTIONS AND THE BIRTHRATE: THE 
SINGLEMINDED APPROACH TO PUBLIC POLICY 
By Daniel C. Schaffer* and Donald H. Berman** 
The last decade has seen the rise and fall of overpopulation as a 
pressing domestic issue. In 1970, Congress established a Commis-
sion on Population Growth and the American Future,l which duly 
brought forth a report. 2 It is hard to imagine Congress doing any-
thing of the sort today, because the birthrate in the United States 
has declined very rapidly over only a few years since then. 3 More 
significant than the current birthrate, perhaps, is the fact that the 
Bureau of the Census, in questioning young wives on the number of 
births they expect over their lives, has found a sudden and dramatic 
decrease in expected births per couple, from 2.9 per wife in 1967 to 
2.3 per wife in 1971 and 1972.4 The Bureau prepares projections of 
future population based on these surveys of expected births, and 
offers a high and low projection, each based on different assump-
tions about the future. The Bureau's high and low projections made 
in 1970 (based on the 1967 survey of birth expectations) and high 
and low projections made at the end of 1972 (based on the new 
survey) are given in Table 1.5 The difference is striking. 
Year 
(July 1) 
Estimates 
1970 
1972 
Projections 
1972 
1980 
1990 
2000 
2010 
2020 
X Not applicable. 
TABLE 1 
COMPARISON OF THE RANGE OF PREVIOUS 
PROJECTIONS AND CURRENT PROJECTIONS: 
1970 to 2020 
(Population in thousands) 
Previous projections, Current projections Series P-25, No. 470 
Series B Series E Series C Series F 
204,800 204,879 
(X) (X) 208,837 
209,484 209,016 (X) 
236,725 227,765 230,955 221,848 
278,570 251,431 266,238 230,084 
322,277 271,082 300,406 250,686 
381,169 290,712 344,094 259,332 
447,003 307,402 392,030 264,564 
687 
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So the heat is off, although perhaps only for the moment. It is 
important to understand that predictions of future births over many 
years, by the method of extrapolating from today's birthrate, or the 
expectations of wives today, are utterly unreliable. This method 
(although no one has yet found a better one) would, if applied at 
almost any point in the past, have given a completely false predic-
tion of today's population. The number of children which couples 
choose to bear has changed dramatically over relatively short per-
iods in the past, and may do so in the future. Demographers know 
this, the shift in the Bureau's projections shows this well enough, 
and the Bureau is the first to so insist.8 The population boom may 
merely have paused, and not ended. 
Yet even a pause has the happy effect of allowing the subject to 
be discussed more calmly. We wish to discuss only one small part 
of the subject: the place of income tax deductions for personal ex-
emptions in a policy which aims to control population. What we 
hope to show is that one cannot manipulate the income tax for this 
social goal without first understanding why the income tax has its 
present shape. We also think that the difficulties inherent in using 
tax exemptions to induce birth control shed light on certain ethical 
problems which any attempt to control population growth through 
financial incentives or disincentives must face. 
I. PRESENT LAW 
The Internal Revenue Code today grants to a taxpayer a deduc-
tion of $750 for each of his or her children, if the taxpayer provides 
half of the child's support.7 No deduction is permitted if the child 
is married and files a joint return with his or her spouse, or if the 
child's gross income is $750 or more, but the latter restriction is 
waived for children under 19, and students.8 This deduction is called 
the "personal exemption." There is an exemption for each taxpayer; 
this article deals only with those for children. 
ll. THE ATTACK 
The availability of this deduction has been constantly attacked 
by those who see population growth in the United States as a crucial 
problem. One would expect the attack from the zealots,' but even 
moderate and judicious menlO say that if we want to reduce births, 
and if we find that merely helping those who want fewer children 
to help themselves does not do the job, we should get rid of the 
personal exemption. 
The reason that population planners are attracted to financial 
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incentives and disincentives is not often articulated, but seems 
plain. Once one has tried family planning (helping parents to avoid 
unwanted children), the next step must be financial devices, or 
outright coercion. Now coercion is not only politically unpopular, 
morally repugnant, and possibly unconstitutional; it is also unen-
forceable. For example, suppose the law forbade any woman to have 
more than two children. Can anyone imagine an American police-
man arresting, an American grand jury indicting, or an American 
jury convicting a woman who committed this "crime," especially if 
she testified that her contraceptive had failed and that her religious 
convictions forbade abortion?l1 No wonder there is interest in dis-
couraging births through financial disincentives, including the 
repeal of the personal exemption for children. 
III. THE CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE OF THE PERSONAL EXEMPTION 
Those population planners who see no reason to repeal the per-
sonal exemption for children have so far merely said that the deduc-
tion is too small to affect the decision to have children. This was the 
conclusion of the Commission on Population Growth and the Ameri-
can Future. 12 Arguing from the same premise, Professor Rabin has 
criticized Senator Packwood's proposal to allow personal exemp-
tions only for a taxpayer's first two children as too weak, and has 
suggested that instead all personal exemptions for children be with-
drawn. "The actual financial hardship of raising two children with-
out a deduction may effectively discourage production of a third 
••• "13 Professor Rabin's agreement with the Commission that the 
personal exemption is probably unimportant to the decision to con-
ceivel4 leads him to advocate a surtax on children, of which more 
later. 
It may well be that the Commission is right, but the truth is that 
no one knows. The deduction was $600 per child in 1969, and a 
family with the median income for that year would have had a 
marginal federal income tax rate of about 20%. Taking the deduc-
tion as worth $120 per year (20% of 600), it would be worth $2,160 
over eighteen years, undiscounted. Considering that the Commis-
sion calculated the total cost of raising a first child at about $98,000 
(undiscounted) one can well imagine that a saving of $2,160 would 
have little influence on parental choice. 
The Commission's computation, however, is an oversimplifi-
cation of a research report which it received. 15 The Commission used 
$32,830 as the out-of-pocket cost of raising a child, not including the 
cost of college education, the cost of giving hirth, or a mother's 
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foregone earnings. 18 The research report emphasized that families 
vary in the amount they spend to raise a child, with family income 
being the main determinant. 17 (It also emphasized that available 
data was crude.) The cost chosen by the Commission ($32,830) was 
that given in a research report as the cost for an urban family on a 
"moderate" budget, which at that time meant disposable income of 
$10,500 to $12,500. 18 On a "low-cost" budget of between $7500 to 
$8000 of disposable income the research report found that the cost 
was $21,630 (undiscounted).'u 
In other words, the Commission chose the highest figure from a 
study which insisted that the out-of-pocket costs of raising children 
varied greatly from family to family. (The report did not discuss 
expenditure figures for budgets above the "moderate" level.) Then 
the Commission added the cost of a college education but, unlike 
the report, did not mention that in 1971 only about one~third of the 
persons between the ages of 25 and 29 had attended college, much 
less graduated.20 Finally, the Commission computed a mother's loss 
of earnings as $58,437 (undiscounted), remarking in its text that the 
loss "might" be that high for a first child, but would be lower for 
later children.21 In the research report, these are the earnings fore-
gone not by the average woman having her first child, but by the 
average woman who would have worked full time in the absence of 
children, who is having her first child. The average foregone earn-
ings for all women, including those women who would not have 
worked in any case, in raising a first child are much lower: $20,487.22 
The most misleading part of the Commission's statement of the 
cost of raising children is that it gives only the cost of raising a first 
child. Population booms result when families have several children. 
The research report submitted to the Commission was emphatic 
that a mother lost comparatively little in earnings in raising addi-
tional children after the first. The research report concluded that 
the total undiscounted cost of each child after the first, in 1969, 
including foregone earnings and college education, was $48,793.23 
If we subtract the cost of college education, it was about $43,000. 
The undiscounted value of the personal exemption for eighteen 
years ($2,160) is about five per cent of this cost, a reduction in price 
which for some products has been thought to stimulate demand 
significantly. To make a crass comparison, the investment tax 
credit for the purchase of machine is set at seven per cent of the 
machinery's price. It is set at less than five per cent of the price of 
public utility machinery, and machinery with a useful life of less 
than seven years.24 
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Nevertheless, we doubt that the exemption does much to increase 
the birthrate. We would guess that the decision to have a child is 
less likely to be influenced by price than a decision to purchase 
productive machinery, and, more importantly, that few people even 
know their marginal tax rates, or the cost of raising a child. But this 
is conjecture. No one really knows, and it would be difficult to 
design an experiment to determine the impact of such an incentive 
on one's decision to bear children. 
The notion that tax exemptions do not affect the birthrate is 
especially vulnerable because, in the long run, small changes in the 
birthrate produce enormous differences in the size of the population. 
For example, Mr. Enke mentions that the population of this country 
in twenty-seven years would be five million fewer if the average 
woman bore 2.1 children over her lifetime instead of 2.2 children.25 
Such a change in birthrate would occur if out of every ten wives, one 
decides to have one less child. If great oaks from small acorns grow, 
an exemption which fosters the planting of even a few additional 
acorns can have remarkable results in the long run (and thirty years 
is not even the long run in demography). 
If no one knows whether the personal exemption for children in-
creases the birthrate, and if we want someday (or even today) to 
decrease the birthrate, why not eliminate the exemption? If it may 
help, why not try it? The Commission, and Professor Rabin, see 
nothing to lose, and it is this that leads Professor Rabin to reject 
Senator Packwood's plan (exemptions only for the first two chil-
dren)28 as too weak, and to put forward his own plans of withdrawing 
exemptions for the first three children, or of a tax surcharge on 
children.27 
IV. THE REAL REASON FOR KEEPING THE EXEMPTION 
The real reason for letting the personal exemption stand is that 
it serves a vital purpose of present tax policy. Those who want to 
take away the personal exemption have never asked why it is there 
in the first place. One cannot speak of repealing the exemption as 
if there were nothing to lose: in fact, there is plenty to lose. 
The personal exemption is today the main instrument for remov-
ing the poor from federal income tax rolls. A family of four is enti-
tled to deduct $3,000 in exemptions, plus the $1,300 standard de-
duction (which does not vary with family size). Their income is 
therefore not taxed until it exceeds $4,300, a figure deliberately set 
"to bring the tax-free income levels up to the 1972 poverty level in 
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almost all cases, and also to provide tax relief to lower income per-
sons above the poverty level. "28 The reference to "lower income 
persons above the poverty level" is important: the "official" poverty 
level is generally admitted to exclude from the definition many who 
are in dire need. 29 The use of the exemption thus represents a delib-
erate and recent Congressional decision, not likely to be overturned 
lightly. For the poor, the personal exemption is the most important 
provision in the Internal Revenue Code. 
The personal exemption is a method of providing a zero tax rate 
for the "officially" poor, and a very low tax rate for the near poor. 
The exemption is well-suited to its function because the income 
level at which a family is deemed officially poor increases with the 
number of its children. It was the use of the personal exemption that 
allowed the Senate Finance Committee to present this table, which 
is now law, to Congress.30 
TABLE 2 POVERTY INCOME LEVELS AND TAX-FREE .INCOME LEVELS 
UNDER 2 LOW-INCOME ALLOWANCE LEVELS BY FAMILY SIZE 
1. 
2 . 
3 ... 
4 .. 
5 ... 
6 .. 
Number in the family 
Tax-free income level with 
$750 exemption and-
Estimated -----------
1972 poverty 
level 
$2,170 
2,810 
3,350 
4,290 
5,050 
5,680 
$1,000 
allowance 
$1,750 
2,500 
3,250 
4,060 
4,750 
5,500 
$1,300 
allowance 
$2,050 
2,800 
3,580 
4,860 
5,060 
5,800 
The exemption is not the only possible method of relieving the poor 
of tax, but every alternative which we have seen recognizes that tax 
liability must decline as family size increases. 
Under the Packwood proposal, a family of six which today would 
pay no tax because their income of $5,800 is just cancelled by per-
sonal exemptions and the standard deduction would pay a tax of 
$225 or 4% of its earnings. Under Professor Rabin's plan, a family 
of four earning $4,300, which today pays no tax, would pay a tax of 
$215 or 5% of its earnings. If there are those who doubt that the loss 
of this much income would be a hardship to a poor family which did 
not respond to the tax disincentive, let them remember that the 
purpose of taking away the income is to impose a hardship. It is only 
if the taxpaying couple feel the loss as a real threat that they are 
likely to respond to it by altering their family planning.31 
These figures should make clear why those who, like Mr. Enke 
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and Mr. McCracken, think repeal of the personal exemption cannot 
affect the poor, since the poor pay no taxes anyway, are mistaken. 
The very reason that the poor pay no taxes is that they have the 
personal exemption, and many people who are poor by any standard 
except the official one do pay taxes, and would pay much heavier 
taxes without the personal exemption. 
It is not only the poor who benefit from the personal exemption. 
A family of six with a gross income of $10,000 and no deductions 
except personal exemptions and the standard deduction would 
today pay a tax of $620. Reducing their personal exemptions by two 
would increase their tax by $285, or 2.85% of their gross income. 
(Under Professor Rabin's plan the same would happen to a family 
of four.) A family of six with a gross income of $100,000, and no 
deduction other than personal exemptions and the standard deduc-
tion would lose $900 if two of its personal exemptions were taken 
away, but this would be only .9% of the family's gross income. Such 
a reduction in personal exemptions would not only tax the poor who 
now go untaxed, but would make the income tax generally less 
progressive. 
So useful are exemptions in making the income tax progressive 
that an income tax which imposed the same rate of tax on all tax-
payers, but gave each the same fixed exemption, would be progres-
sive. This is in fact one of the strongest theoretical arguments for 
progression as a principle of taxation: almost everyone, including 
those who oppose graduated rates, agrees that some portion of in-
come should be exempt from tax, if only to provide for bare subsist-
ence. Yet once this is conceded, progression is inevitable, because 
an income tax with an exemption is progressive even if its rate on 
income above the exempt level is the same for all. 32 There would be 
no loss of progressivity, however, if the personal exemption were 
replaced by a larger standard deduction which did not depend on 
family size. 
An exemption which did not depend on family size, however, 
would have obvious faults. Here are the words of the nation's lead-
ing tax economists comparing the federal social security payroll tax 
with the federal income tax: 33 
The payroll tax is grossly inferior to the individual income tax in its 
treatment of people with equal incomes . . . Income alone does not 
differentiate a man's ability to pay; his family responsibilities are also 
important. Making ends meet on an income of $3,000 is much more 
difficult for a man with a wife and two children than for a single person 
without dependents . . . The individual income tax takes such differ-
ences into account through the personal exemptions . . . which are 
subtracted before arriving at income subject to tax. 
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By contrast, the payroll tax is levied on gross wages without any 
allowance for family sizE.'. Thus in 1968 a wage earner with earnings of 
$3,200 paid $243.20 as social security tax ... whether he was a single 
or family man. For a couple with two children, the official "poverty-
line" is $3,335; that is more than twice the poverty-line income for a 
single person. 
The incompatibility of the view held by many, that the tax laws 
should treat children as decreasing one's ability to pay, with the 
population controller's wish to penalize the bearing of children, is 
seen most clearly at low incomes. It may be that the personal ex-
emption promotes births most among the poor, because the tax 
reduction for the poor is greater than for anyone else, not in dollar 
amounts, but in its ratio to taxable income. Yet it is just this dispro-
portionate reduction in tax that makes the exemption useful in 
reducing the taxes paid by the poor. 
The point is not that the Internal Revenue Code is a Jehovah, 
commanding us that "Thou shalt have no other gods before me."34 
It is that a population planner may get nowhere if he or she unwit-
tingly proposes a law which undoes some other policy (such as in-
come redistribution) which many others think crucial. Once the 
population planner sees the conflict, he or she may be able to recon-
cile competing interests, or to show that population control is so 
important that it should prevail. We do not say that the federal 
income tax may not be made less progressive and equitable in order 
to foster some other societal interests. On the contrary, Congress has 
done this many times. The favorable taxation of capital gains and 
the deductibility of interest on home mortgages are familiar exam-
ples. We concede that society may have to give up a great deal more 
than Section 151 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 if we are to 
survive, but those asking us to sacrifice the goal of income redistri-
bution have an obligation to justify their request. 
To govern is to choose, to give up one imperative to achieve an-
other. The trouble with certain population controllers is they do not 
see that they are asking for a choice.35 Myrdal tells of this kind of 
misunderstanding in India:36 
There have been many suggestions for creating a motivation for birth 
control by penalizing economically the families who have many children 
by rewarding those who have few. But they have never crept into any 
plan in the region. The reason is not difficult to understand. Since 
having many children is a main cause of poverty, such measures would 
penalize the relatively poor and subsidize the relatively well off. Such a 
result would not only violate rules of equity but would be detrimental 
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to the health of the poor families, and so of the growing generation. 
The lesson to be learned is that population control, if it is impor-
tant at all, is not all that is important to most people. Tails should 
not wag dogs; a great deal of the difficulty in law-making is in 
deciding which is the tail and which is the dog, and the worst law-
maker is the one who does not even see the dog. 
Professor Rabin, afraid that denial of exemptions is too weak a 
penalty to inhibit births, suggests an income tax surcharge instead. 
A family would have its income tax increased by, say, 5% for each 
child it brings into the world.37 This would at least avoid taxing 
those who now pay no tax, and would impose the heaviest penalties 
on those who pay the most tax. 
Who would pay such a tax? The poor would probably be exempt.3S 
Yet the poor and near-poor have higher birthrates than the middle 
class. 3D Perhaps the failure to apply a tax on children to the poor is 
only a small loss to population planning because, as officially de-
fined, they are only between ten and fifteen per cent of the nation. 
But there is no doubt that the majority of children are born into 
families whose incomes are below the median, or only moderately 
above it.40 One would want a tax large enough to change behavior, 
yet small enough so that it does not work a hardship on this class. 
Is there such a middle ground? We have already belabored the 
importance of family size as a proper measure of poor peoples' abil-
ity to pay. Now we are suggesting that it is important in taxing the 
middle class, too, a view quite widely held. 41 
There may be those who believe that for a family earning $6,000, 
$10,000 or $12,000, extra children do not reduce ability to pay. Un-
doubtedly there are those who believe that population control is so 
important that the question of ability to pay income taxes must not 
get in its way. Once dgain, we are not so much disagreeing with 
those who so believe, as reminding them that if they call for an 
income tax surcharge on children they must be ready to argue these 
points. 
Professor Rabin's income tax surcharge for each child born might 
be thought to levy at least a tax related to ability to pay, so that 
the rich would pay more for their procreative sins. That is, if the 
income tax is progressive, surely an income tax surcharge for each 
child would bear hardest On those with ability to pay. Alas, this is 
not so. Although the federal income tax is moderately progressive 
when one plots the average effective rate (ratio of tax paid to all 
income, including income now exempt from tax) against the average 
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income of any income class, within each income class the effective 
rate varies wildly. There are taxpayers earning huge amounts who 
pay nothing, and taxpayers earning moderate incomes who pay 
heavily. The Treasury summarized this state of affairs in the follow-
ing table in 1969,42 since which very little has changed: 
TABLE 3 PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RETURNS BY EFFECTIYE TAX RATE CLASSES: PRESENT LAW TAX 
AS A PERCENT OF AMENDED TAXABLE INCOME.' BY AGI CLASSES. 1969 LEVELS 
AGI (in thoWMlndaofdollll1'll) 0 .. , 5toi0 10 to 15 151020 20 to 25 
0 .. 3 ".0 0.' ... '.0 ('j 
3to' 14.2 , .. 11.0 83.0 ('j 
5to7 3.6 '.1 22.' 71.5 ('j 
7toiO .. 1.1 22,4 70.' 6.3 
10 to 16 . 6 .. •. , .... 6.7 
151020 ., .7 .. , 12.' ".1 
"to", .• .7 3.' 27.' .... 
50 to 100 . 3 .. I., ..• 11.9 
10010500 1.0 .. ., I.. 14.1 
500101000 1.8 .. .. .. 24.8 
1.000 and over '.0 .2 .2 .2 31.0 
AlId_ ... 21.5 1.1 10.9 52.7 ... 
L Amended tillable income ie tillable income after declue.don cbanpe pl .. euluded 
upital pillll, trox·eumpt interest, and tIICMI of pm:eotap over emt depletion. Amended 
taxable income ie uaed. to m&intain • common ba. ror the effective nlte eomputation UDder 
pre.ent I .... nd under the reform))l'Olfllm. 
• NontallBble are 67.6 percent. 
Effeeti\lel.ln:r.tee~ 
" .. ., "' .. " " .... 
...... 45 to 50 
"' .. " .... '" 
., .... 
.. .. 70 
('j ('j ('j ('j ('j ('j ('j ('j ('j 
('j ('j ('j ('j ('j ('j ('j ('j ('j 
('1 ('j ('j .. ('j ('j 
.. 
'.3 
14.6 3.3 .7 ., ('j 
22.3 3<.6 18.5 U 1.3 .3. ..... ['j 
15.5 11.2 15.3 19." 12.2 6.' , .. • ('j 31.0 '.7 6.0 3.' '.6 ..• 7.' 12.7 .. 
27.' 6.2 1.8 , .. '.0 1.8 2.7 12.3 ... 
2.0 .. .6 .3 .2 ., .1 .1 I.' 
• The petcentllptl in theIe effective rate c~ are not YU)' meanilllful beea ... they 
reflect pNMnt law tu divided by •• mall 1lID0000t of ameuded taDble irn:ome under the 
reform prDIfIIm. Amended tn.b)e income ror tt.. t.u~ iI much _':lIer than ..-at 
law tIIuble income primarily bec:1\118 of tbe hiBber MSD under the NlGna. PftIIl'lm • 
'Le..thf,n.06percent 
It may be that as an income tax system this is defensible (al-
though we ourselves think not). For example, it may be that the 
exemption from income tax for interest from state and local bonds, 
or the preferential treatment of capital gains is so useful to society 
that it excuses the imposition of different rates of tax on persons 
with the same incomes. But is there any sense at all in making the 
amount of a financial disincentive to procreate tum on whether the 
procreator invests in such bonds, or has capital gain rather than 
ordinary income? Perhaps there is, but does Professor Rabin even 
realize that this is what he has proposed? 
There may be those who think that giving birth to a large number 
of children is so anti-social an act that parents who do so deserve 
to suffer, or that, having imposed special costs on society, they 
should pay for doing so. On that ground there might be nothing 
wrong with increasing taxes on those who reproduced "unduly." But 
when one decreases the disposable income of a family as the number 
of children in the family increases, there is a strong possibility that 
the family will simply spend less on the care of each child. Even 
those who see nothing wrong with penalizing parents for having 
children ought to ask themselves if it is right to penalize children 
for being born. 43 
V. A BETTER, BUT STILL UNSATISFACTORY, SYSTEM 
There is a way to use the personal exemption to discourage births 
without making the income tax less progressive. The method is to 
TAX EXEMPTIONS 697 
grant a larger dependency exemption for the first child, none for the 
second, and the same exemption as today's law provides for addi-
tional children. For example, the exemptions available for each 
child under current law and under our proposed scheme could be 
these: 
Current Law 
Proposed 
First 
Child 
750 
1,500 
Second 
Child 
750 
o 
Third 
Child 
750 
750 
Fourth, etc. 
Child 
750 
750 
Under this scheme, no family is worse off than under current law: 
unlike the Packwood or Rabin plans, it does not make the poor 
poorer for being fruitful. This system merely tells a family consider-
ing a second birth that the federal government's subsidy for the 
costs of raising its children will remain the same even though its 
costs of raising children will increase. 
On the other hand, the family with only one child is clearly better 
off than under present law. This effect might be thought to undo the 
whole purpose of the plan, by providing an incentive to have a first 
child. The objection, however, is groundless, because an increase in 
the exemption for the first child can influence only those who now 
plan to have no children. The latest census data show that only 3.6% 
of wives in the age group 18 to 24 years fall into this category. 44 
There is a special advantage in denying the exemption for the 
second child: more than half of all wives in the 18 to 24 year age 
group (the most fertile group) expect to have only two children. 45 It 
is precisely on a family with such an expectation that our scheme 
operates. 
Notice that we have by this proposal only papered over the ques-
tion of the right way to run a welfare state. One of the most common 
problems in the provision of government benefits is whether they 
should go to everyone or only to those in special need. If the present 
reason for the personal exemption is to measure need by family size, 
and to ameliorate that need to some degree, then to confer an extra 
exemption on a family with only one child is to grant a windfall. 
Once again, a serious issue of income distribution is disguised by 
treating the problem as purely one of population control. 
The problem becomes clearer when we look at an even stronger 
incentive against births: an exemption of $2,250 for the first child, 
and none for the second and third. Such a policy would be enor-
mously expensive: it would grant three exemptions to every family 
which now has one or two children. The increase in exemptions 
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granted would be about 21 million48 and about $15,000,000,000 of tax 
base would be lost. This seems a large sum of income to exempt 
from tax to produce an incentive which, for all anyone knows, may 
not change anyone's behavior. 
Even under the more modest system of granting every parent with 
one child an extra exemption, there will be a revenue loss, and it 
will be large. The 1970 Census found about 7,800,000 families with 
only one child under eighteen presentY (The Revenue Service's 
Statistics for 1969 show about 10,000,000 returns claiming three 
exemptions: 48 presumably many of these returns were from married 
couples with one child, but this group also includes couples with a 
dependent who is not a child, and divorced, widowed and single 
parents with two dependents.) The granting of an extra exemption 
to each of these families would, with today's exemption of $750, 
remove about $6,800,000,000 from the tax base. If one assumes an 
average marginal rate of 20% for these taxpayers (a conservative 
estimate) and disregards the fact that some do not pay tax, the 
revenue loss would be well over $1,000,000,000. This is obviously a 
rough calculation, yet it seems likely to be of the right order of 
magnitude. 
VI. FROM REVENUE Loss TO SOCIAL JUSTICE 
It might be asked why, if we are concerned with revenue loss, we 
should grant an extra exemption to a family with a high income and 
only one child, even if we are granting such exemptions to poor 
families, especially since the higher marginal rates of the rich make 
the extra exemption worth more to them in dollar amount. The 
reason is that whatever method of discouraging procreation we 
adopt, the last thing we want is to discourage only the poor, or only 
the middle class from having children. Whether we use an incentive 
or disincentive, we must be sure that we do not create one law of 
birth control for the rich and another for the poor,49 or at least that 
we do so only with full understanding that that is what we are doing. 
Indeed even the scheme we have proposed, if it affected anyone's 
behavior, would surely have most influence on those with incomes 
just high enough to be subject to tax. There is no easy way out of 
this dilemma. Since exemptions favor the poor, the extention of 
exemptions to induce birth control seems likely to push hardest on 
the poor to use birth control. Present law grants exemptions accord-
ing to number of children on the premise that the larger the number 
of children, the less the ability to pay. As we move away from this 
use of exemptions, we move away from ability to pay as the measure 
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of liability (the essence of a progressive income tax) and towards 
ability to pay as a determinant of family planning. This is not the 
most happy of choices, and it would be all too easy to do it without 
realizing quite what we had done. 
It might be possible to reduce the revenue cost by extending two 
exemptions to poor families with one child, and then phasing out 
exemptions as income increases, until they disappeared at some 
much higher income level. This plan has indeed been suggested as 
good tax policy since it would increase progression. The policy even 
has a name: "the vanishing exemption." The lowest brackets would 
be offered two full $750 exemptions for one child, and none for the 
second; the higher brackets would be offered two small exemptions 
for one child, and none for the second; and the wealthiest no exemp-
tions at all. 
This proposal has its faults, too. The "vanishing exemption" is 
advocated by those who believe that as income increases the num-
ber of one's children eventually becomes irrelevant to one's ability 
to pay. In 1971, most exemptions for dependents (more than 75%) 
were taken by those with adjusted gross incomes under $15,000.50 
We have already expressed doubt that family size is irrelevant to 
ability to pay at that income level;51 but if the exemption were to 
start to vanish only above that level, the revenue saving would be 
much less. 
Worse, if there is a level of income so high that the number of 
one's children is unrelated to ability to pay, we again face the accu-
sation, which we cannot answer, of having designed a system which 
will induce birth control more strongly at lower income levels than 
at high. 
If, as we have been arguing, any system which relies on the ma-
nipulation of tax exemptions to induce birth control is likely to exert 
most influence on the behavior of those with the lowest incomes (or 
to harm them in a way which society has already decided not to do), 
and if, as we think, this would be unjust, the only alternative is a 
system of subsidies (not necessarily tax incentives) for the poorest 
who reduce their birthrate, phasing as income increases into taxes 
on the more wealthy who have "too many" children. Such a system 
has been forcefully advocated on the subtle, and quite correct, 
ground that economic inducements to birth control have some of the 
benefits of a market system.52 As in any market system, the method 
of allocation of a "resource" takes into account how much each 
"consumer" wants the resource. Compare, for example, a rule that 
no one can have more than two children (which we have already 
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condemned as unenforceable) with economic inducements calcu-
lated to reduce the birthrate to an average of two per couple over 
their lifetimes. Under the first scheme, two couples are treated alike 
although one couple may want very much to have three children, 
and the second may have only a mild desire for a second child. In a 
s(!heme of economic inducements, the first couple could have their 
three children (paying the price in lost subsidies or increased taxes) 
and the second would be nudged into having only the one they want. 
Both systems would produce four children (although under a coer-
cive system, if it could be enforced, there would be more certainty 
as to the number of children born), but under a market-like system 
the children would be allocated to those who want them most. 
The cost of raising children may already discourage the poor from 
bearing children, and the fact that they now have a high birth rate 
may be attributable to their inability to obtain methods of avoiding 
or aborting conception. (Indeed, this seems to be the official view.)53 
Requiring the poor to forego a subsidy if they have children can only 
make lack of income more important in discouraging procreation. 
The problem, once again, is to what extent we are willing to allow 
inequality of income and wealth to produce an allocation which is 
based not merely, as now, on how much people want children, and 
on the extent to which their wealth allows them to disregard eco-
nomic constraints, but also on the constraints of an official system 
of economic subsidies and taxes. There are some "rights" as to 
which we find market allocation intolerable because of income ine-
quality. We now provide food, medical care, and legal counsel even 
to the poorest, and many feel that we should go further along this 
road. It seems likely that the "right" to have children is so personal 
and precious that we will be unwilling to leave its allocation to the 
market, once we make market constraints more stringent than 
today by a policy of subsidies for and taxes on birth. After all, even 
our Supreme Court finds procreation more worthy of protection 
than welfare payments or equality of expenditure on education. 54 
There is a well-recognized way out of this dilemma: to reduce 
inequality of wealth and income. If it is outrageous to offer a starv-
ing couple a subsidy for using birth control, because they are so 
much more likely to be influenced by the subsidy than other cou-
ples, (to the point that "influence" becomes coercion),55 why not 
first give each couple enough income so that they will not starve 
even if they choose to forego the subsidy? If a tax on childbearing 
by the rich is unlikely to affect their behavior unless it is steep, 
why not make it steep? And, indeed, the leading proponent of a 
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"market" in the right to bear children, created by subsidies and 
taxes, quite candidly says such a scheme would be fair only if the 
poor were first granted a "floor" income (the amount left unspeci-
fied) which would provide them with the necessities of life and if 
the "birth tax" on the rich were so high as to be perhaps confisca-
tory of both income, wealth, and even the expectation of inheriting 
wealth.56 Here again, a major political and intellectual issue of our 
time-the redistribution of income-is treated as a trivial question, 
and the real problem seen as population control, but this time with 
an elegant microeconomic analysis added. We think it fair to say 
that if this country ever radically redistributes wealth it will not be 
in order to construct a micro economically elegant system of popula-
tion control. 
Having used the question of revenue loss to lead us into the diffi-
culty that financial inducements to control birth are all too likely 
to weigh more heavily upon some income classes than others, we can 
now return to the more simple point that one does not give up a 
billion dollars or so in tax revenue without asking if the goal is worth 
the money, and if it is, whether the money could not be spent on 
the goal in a more efficient way. The first question has no "right" 
answer, although it is worth noting that the United States Govern-
ment has never directly appropriated anything like a billion dollars 
a year to restrain births,57 and that we live in a country in which a 
good many people die prematurely for lack of medical care, or live 
out their lives in a state of malnutrition. 
As to the best way to spend a billion dollars to restrain births, 
everyone recognizes that there are obvious advantages in using the 
money to help those who want to avoid conception. A dollar spent 
to teach contraception to those who want to use it is surely more 
likely to prevent a birth than one spent in the mere hope of inducing 
the recipient to want to use contraception. Even if this turns out not 
to be a sufficient policy, everyone seems to agree that it should be 
the first tried,58 and that more along this line could be done if there 
were more money available. 59 This is usually called the "voluntar-
ist" approach; the only question is whether it is, by itself, enough. 
Suppose then, that we have fully funded every program which 
could help avoid unwanted births, and still find our birthrate too 
high. Should we then spend a huge sum on cash incentives not to 
have children? At this point, the question is purely one of cost-
effectiveness. Earlier we have said that the elimination of exemp-
tions might reduce the birthrate, but that there were costs to the 
progressivity and fairness of the income tax. Now we have to say 
that our scheme might work, without reducing that progressivity, 
702 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
but that that is not much of a reason for spending a billion dollars. 
Of course, the federal government has spent large sums of money 
on just such untested and speculative ventures in the recent past, 
but the results have not been uniformly happy ones, and we would 
hope that a lesson has been learned from those experiences. The 
lesson, however, has special applicability to our scheme, because 
not only do we not know if it would work but, even after it was 
enacted, no one would ever know if it was working. Changes in 
birthrates are apparently affected by many variables, and we do not 
know what the variables are. Does this not mean that a tax incentive 
for the control of population is likely to be what in common parlance 
is called a boondoggle? 
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